Security-voting structure and bidder screening by At, Christian et al.
  
Christian At, Mike Burkart and Samuel Lee 
Security-voting structure and bidder 
screening 
 




 Original citation: At, Christian, Burkart, Mike and Lee, Samuel (2011) Security-voting structure and bidder 




© 2010 Elsevier 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/69542/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: February 2017 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 





Security-Voting Structure and Bidder Screening
Christian Aty Mike Burkartz Samuel Leex
September, 2010
Abstract
This paper demonstrates that non-voting shares can promote takeovers. When the
bidder has private information, shareholders may refuse to tender because they suspect
to sell at an ex post unfavourable price. The ensuing friction in the sale of cash ow
rights can prevent an e¢ cient change of control. Separating cash ow and voting rights
alters the degree of cross-subsidization among bidder types. It can therefore be used as
an instrument to promote takeover activity and to discriminate between e¢ cient and
ine¢ cient bidders. The optimal fraction of non-voting shares decreases with managerial
ability, implying an inverse relationship between rm value and non-voting shares.
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1 Introduction
Dual-class shares in publicly traded rms continue to be controversial. The New York Stock
Exchange did not grant listings to rms with multiple share classes, but abandoned this
requirement in 1986. Similarly, the European Commission recently withdrew a proposal to
mandate the one share - one vote principle, which would have banned shares with di¤erential
voting rights and voting restrictions. If these provisions had been adopted, they would have
a¤ected a large number of rms: According to a survey commissioned by the Association of
British Insurers, 29 percent of the top 300 European companies in 2005 had dual-class share
structures. In the US, dual-class shares are less frequent but still fairly common; they are
used in about 6 percent of all publicly-traded rms (Gompers et al., 2008).
Proponents of the one share - one vote rule argue that it is most conducive to an e¢ cient
allocation of corporate control. The theoretical foundation of this view is the analysis of
Grossman and Hart (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1988). In their framework, security
benets and private benets vary across bidders competing for a dispersedly held rm. Since
bidders compete for voting shares, one share - one vote prevents divergence between bidders
willingness-to-pay for control and their ability to create value, thereby ensuring an e¢ cient
control allocation. By contrast, deviations from one share - one vote carry the risk that
an ine¢ cient bidder with large private benets outbids more e¢ cient bidders. At the same
time, a dual-class share structure may be in the shareholdersinterest as it allows extraction
of more surplus from the winning bidder.
It must be noted that the security-voting structure matters for control allocation in
this framework only if bidder ranking with respect to security benets di¤ers from bidder
ranking according to private benets. If the most e¢ cient bidder also has the most private
benets, it wins the bidding contest irrespective of the security-voting structure. Moreover,
the security-voting structure is immaterial to bid price and shareholder wealth in the absence
of (e¤ective) competitors. Due to target shareholder free-rider behaviour (Grossman and
Hart, 1980), the bid price must, under full information, match the winning bidders security
benets. Nonetheless, one share - one vote is optimal in the sense that no other security-
voting structure leads to a more e¢ cient control allocation under this framework.
We show that asymmetric information undermines the dominance of one share - one vote.
Asymmetric information can lead to disagreement about what constitutes an acceptable
price, which in turn may prevent a control transfer. The root of this failure is that cash ow
and control rights must be jointly traded. Separating cash ow and voting rights mitigates
the impact that disagreement on the value of cash ow rights has on the trade of votes.
Thus, contrary to the prevailing view, one share - one vote does not ensure an e¢ cient
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control allocation and is typically inferior to a dual-class share structure.
We develop this idea in a tender o¤er model with atomistic target shareholders and
absent (e¤ective) competition. Instead, the model assumes a single bidder who has private
information about its own ability to create value. As a result, the bid price is determined by
shareholder free-rider behaviour and must at least equal the expected post-takeover share
value. Costly bids are feasible because the bidder can extract as private benets part of
the bidder generated value. Within this framework, we demonstrate that one share - one
vote maximizes the severity of the asymmetric information problem, thereby deterring many
value-increasing takeovers.
In our model, all bidder types who make a bid in equilibrium o¤er the same price. While
the equilibrium price is equal to the average post-takeover share value, some (overvalued)
bidder types pay more and some (undervalued) types pay less than their true post-takeover
share value. In addition, there is a cut-o¤value, and bidder types who generate less value are
deterred as they would make a loss when o¤ering the equilibrium price. Hence, the presence
of asymmetric information has two e¤ects. First, it causes redistribution among all bidder
types who actually make a bid. Second, it exacerbates the free-rider problem as, ceteris
paribus, more bids fail than under symmetric information.
Separating cash ow and voting rights a¤ects the takeover outcome by altering the ex-
tent of redistribution among bidder types and how shareholders update their expectations.
(More) non-voting shares reduce the fraction of return rights that bidders purchase and
therefore render a bid, ceteris paribus, more protable for overvalued bidder types. Hence,
some formerly frustrated bidder types can earn a prot and now make a bid. In response,
shareholders revise their beliefs about post-takeover share value downward and are willing
to tender at a lower price. This indirect price e¤ect makes the takeover protable for more
bidder types.
The monotonic relationship between the fraction of voting shares and the cut-o¤ value
implies that the security-voting structure can be used to discriminate among desirable and
undesirable bids. Unless takeover costs are either too large or too small relative to the bid-
ders private benets, the socially optimal structure implements the rst-best outcome: only
bids with value improvements in excess of the takeover cost succeed. Moreover, whenever
the issuance of non-voting shares is socially optimal, it is also in target shareholder inter-
ests. Our theory provides a rationale for issuing dual-class shares as part of an optimal sale
procedure. Non-voting shares increase the likelihood of a subsequent takeover, which in turn
translates into a higher share price.
The optimal security-voting structure varies with incumbent management quality. More
non-voting shares increase the probability that the incumbent manager is replaced, which is
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warranted for less able managers. Conversely, it is optimal to protect very good management
from takeover threats with the one share - one vote structure. Thus, our model is in accor-
dance with the common perception that the chief merit of the one share - one vote structure
is to prevent value-decreasing bids (Grossman and Hart, 1988). But our model also implies
that one share - one vote may deter value-increasing bids, which is neither socially desirable
nor in shareholder interests.
As a rms current market value improves with the quality of its management, our model
predicts that rms with (more) non-voting shares have lower market values. While this
prediction is consistent with the empirical evidence, the underlying intuition runs counter
to the usual explanation that dual-class shares destroy value because they enable corporate
insiders to extract more private benets (Bebchuk et al., 2000). In our model, the use of
non-voting shares is an optimal response to low rm value under incumbent management,
as it increases the likelihood of a value-increasing takeover.
Like non-voting shares, higher extraction rates promote takeovers. Thus, the optimal
fraction of non-voting shares decreases with private benets. While non-voting shares and
private benet extraction are substitutes, shareholders prefer to promote takeovers by in-
creasing the fraction of non-voting shares rather than by allowing bidders to extract more
private benets. Extraction transfers wealth from shareholders to bidders, whereas the
security-voting structure merely a¤ects the extent of redistribution among bidder types.
This result stands in contrast with the common view, which advocates private benets as a
means to mitigate the free-rider problem, and the one share - one vote structure as a means
to deter value-decreasing bidders (Grossman and Hart, 1980, 1988).
In the main model, we assume a constant extraction rate, which implies a positive rela-
tionship between security and private benets. This is meant to reect circumstances where
a bidders ability to expropriate shareholders is primarily determined by the target rm, in-
dustry, or institutional characteristics. As a result of this positive correlation, shareholders,
in equilibrium, overvalue bidder types with small private benets and undervalue those with
large private benets. Increasing the fraction of voting shares therefore discourages bidder
types with a low propensity to bid. However, when security and private benets are inversely
related, low private benet bidder types are undervalued, and redistribution among bidder
types promotes takeovers (Marquez and Yilmaz, 2006).
In general settings where bidders with large (small) security benets can have large or
small private benets, non-voting shares continue to give rise to the two e¤ects identied
above. First, non-voting shares a¤ect the extent of redistribution among bidders. The im-
pact of the direct redistribution e¤ect is, however, ambiguous in general settings: On the
one hand, less redistribution encourages bidder types with large private benets but small
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security benets. On the other hand, less redistribution discourages bidder types with large
security benets but small private benets. Second, as a result of the redistribution e¤ect,
target shareholders revise their beliefs about post-takeover security benets downward and
are willing to tender at a lower price. The indirect price e¤ect unambiguously promotes
takeovers, as it benets all bidders irrespective of their type. It also highlights that share-
holder beliefs are an important channel through which the security-voting structure a¤ects
takeover activity. When the price e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong, attracting bidder types with
small security benets by lowering the fraction of voting shares ultimately also encourages
bidder types with large security benets. Thus, non-voting shares broaden the pool of active
bidders along both the private benet and the security benet dimensions.
Besides asymmetric information, our analysis assumes a single-bidder setting and a widely
held target rm. As noted above, the literature on the security-voting structure considers
a competitive setting to derive the optimality of one share - one vote. While a successful
bid must exceed any (potential) rival o¤er, it must also win shareholder approval. We
intentionally presuppose that shareholder approval is the binding constraint and consider
a single bidder who makes one o¤er. The single-bidder assumption does not literally rule
out other parties interested in controlling the rm. It merely presumes that no competitor
can create nearly as much value as the bidder under consideration. In fact, the optimal
security-voting structure in our framework is such that the incumbent manager would not
want to match the equilibrium o¤er, as such managers do not create enough value.
Takeover studies document that the single-bidder setting is empirically relevant. For
instance, Betton and Eckbo (2000) report that 62 percent of all US tender o¤er contests
(1,353) between 1971 and 1990 involved only one bid. This does not imply that shareholder
approval is the binding constraint in all these cases. The single bid may instead have been
set above the target shareholder reservation price to deter potential rivals. However, this
hardly holds for the 22 percent of single bids which failed. Further support for shareholder
approval as the binding constraint emerges from multiple-bid takeovers. In this subsample,
all bids are made by the same bidder in 41 percent of cases. In addition, these bid revisions
can only in very few cases be attributed to rumoured competition.
The assumption of a widely held target rm implies that the bid price must satisfy the
free-rider condition. The key consequence of free-rider behaviour in our model is that the
bidders private information about post-takeover security benets is tantamount to private
information about the target shareholders reservation price. Thus, our main result that
the separation of cash ow and voting rights reduces ine¢ ciencies in control transactions is
not restricted to widely held targets, but applies more generally to settings where the bidder
knows more about the sellersoutside options. For example, this is the case when the current
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shareholders suspect that the bidder knows their rm to be undervalued. As regards tender
o¤ers, our results extend to any ownership structure where the majority of voting rights is
dispersedly held. Such ownership patterns are by no means unusual.1
Several papers analyze tender-o¤er games with a single bidder who has private informa-
tion. Grossman and Hart (1981) establish that takeovers require an information advantage
about the value improvement brought about by the bidder. That is, if takeovers were solely
motivated by the bidders knowledge that the target is undervalued, rational shareholders
would not tender. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) show that the acquisition of a stake prior to
the tender o¤er provides a partial solution to the free-rider problem. Their (partial) pooling
equilibrium anticipates the equilibrium outcome in our benchmark case with a single share
class. The di¤erence is that the source of the bidders gains is private benet extraction
rather than toeholds. Hirshleifer and Titman (1990) and Chowdhry and Jegadeesh (1994)
analyze models in which takeover outcomes are probabilistic and equilibrium o¤ers fully
reveal bidder type.2 None of these papers examine the role of the security-voting structure.
As discussed above, Grossman and Hart (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1988) show that
forcing a would-be acquirer to purchase all return rights ensures an e¢ cient control allocation
in a bidding competition but may not maximize shareholder wealth. Bergström et al. (1997)
and Cornelli and Felli (2000) revisit these e¤ects in the context of the mandatory bid rule
and the sale of a bankrupt rm. In Burkart et al. (1998), deviations from one share -
one vote can be socially optimal, though there is no comprehensive analysis of the optimal
security-voting structure. Moreover, the mechanisms through which non-voting shares a¤ect
the takeover outcome di¤er. In their model, the fraction of voting shares determines the
bidders private benets, as opposed to shareholder expectations about post-takeover security
benets. Gromb (1992) shows in a framework with a nite number of shareholders that non-
voting shares mitigate the free-rider problem. Reducing the number of voting shares makes
each voting shareholder more likely to be pivotal and increases their tendering probability.3
This model, contrary to our own, predicts that voting shares trade at a discount.
Our paper is perhaps most closely related to Marquez and Yilmaz (2006). Like us, these
authors analyze the pooling equilibrium in a tender o¤er game with a privately informed
1In the sample of Gompers et al. (2008), which comprises all dual-class rms in the US between 1995 and
2002, corporate insiders do not have the majority of votes in about a third of the observations. In the sample
of Pajuste (2005), which covers 493 dual-class rms from seven European countries (Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland) over the period 1996-2002, the two largest shareholders
together control less than 20 percent of the votes in about a quarter of the rms. In the subsample of all
rms (63) that were taken over, the majority of Swedish targets (16 out of 25) had widely held, dual-class
shares.
2Separating cash ow and voting rights also promotes takeovers in variants of the tender o¤er game that
allow for separating equilibrium outcomes (Burkart and Lee, 2010).
3For the same reason, supermajority rules increase takeover probability (Holmström and Nalebu¤, 1992).
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bidder. They focus on the impact that shareholder information has on the takeover out-
come and the division of takeover gains. In an extension, they also consider supermajority
rules which, when restricted bids are allowed, are tantamount to higher fractions of voting
shares in a dual-class share structure. Yet, because they restrict attention to the case of
negative correlation between security and private benets, they neither identify the benets
of separating cash ow and voting rights nor the key role of the (assumed) correlation be-
tween security and private benets. In this sense, our paper complements their ndings on
supermajority rules.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the model and derives the pooling
equilibrium in a simple case with a single share class and value-increasing bidders. Section 3
solves the model for a dual-class target and demonstrates that deviations from one share - one
vote mitigate the asymmetric information problem. Section 4 introduces value-decreasing
bidders and shows that the security-voting structure can be used to screen bidder types. We
derive the socially and shareholder optimal security-voting structure and examine the com-
parative static properties of these structures. Section 5 discusses more general settings which
allow for alternative correlations between security and private benets. Concluding remarks
are set forth in Section 6, and the mathematical proofs are presented in the Appendix.
2 Model
Consider a widely held rm that faces a single potential acquirer, henceforth bidder B. If the
bidder gains control, it can generate revenues V . While the bidder learns its type prior to





according to the continuously di¤erentiable density function g(V ). The cumulative
density function is denoted by G(V ).
In addition, the bidder can divert part of the revenues as private benets. The non-
contractible diversion decision is modelled as the bidders choice of  2 0; , such that
security benets (dividends) are X = (1   )V and her private benets are  = V . The
upper bound  2 (0; 1) is commonly known and identical for all bidder types. This latter
assumption will be relaxed in Section 5 where we allow for a more general type space.
Tender o¤ers are the only admissible mode of takeover, and a successful o¤er requires that
the bidder attracts at least 50 percent of the rms voting rights. To illustrate the workings
of the model, we rst consider the one share - one vote structure and defer the analysis of
dual-class shares to subsequent sections. If the takeover succeeds, the bidder incurs a xed
cost K of administrating the takeover which is independent of bidder type and is common
knowledge.
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If the takeover does not materialize, the incumbent manager remains in control. The
incumbent can generate revenues V I , which are known to all shareholders. Like the bidder,
the incumbent can extract a fraction  2 0;  of the revenues. Hence, shareholders obtain
XI = (1 )V I in the absence of a takeover. Initially, we restrict attention to value-increasing
bids and set V I = V . The sequence of events unfolds as follows.
In stage 1, the bidder learns its type V and decides whether to make a take-it-or-leave-it,
conditional, unrestricted tender o¤er. If the bidder does not make a bid, the game moves
directly to stage 3. If the bidder does make a bid, it o¤ers to purchase all shares for total price
P , provided that at least 50 percent of the shares (voting rights) are tendered. Moreover,
the o¤er must be for cash, which precludes that its terms depend on the future observation
of V . We discuss this last assumption on the form of the bid at the end of this section.
In stage 2, the target shareholders non-cooperatively decide whether to tender their
shares. Shareholders are homogeneous and atomistic and do not perceive themselves as
pivotal to the tender o¤er outcome.
In stage 3, if at least 50 percent of the shares are tendered, the bidder gains control
and pays price P and cost K. Otherwise, the incumbent manager remains in control. In
either case, the controlling party chooses which fraction  of the revenues to divert as private
benets, subject to the constraint   .
Given that private benet extraction entails no deadweight loss, the stage 3 diversion
decision is straightforward. Setting  =  is a successful bidders (weakly) dominant strategy,
and the post-takeover security benets are independent of the size of the bidders nal stake.
If the bid fails or does not materialize, the incumbent manager chooses likewise the maximum
extraction rate , as the incumbent owns no equity.
Since shareholders are atomistic, each one tenders at stage 2 only if the o¤ered price at
least matches the expected security benets. Shareholders condition their expectations on
o¤ered price P , known takeover cost K and anticipated extraction decision  = . Hence, a
successful tender o¤er must satisfy the free-rider condition
P  E (XjP;K; ) = (1  )E (V jP;K) .
For simplicity, we assume that shareholders - after observing bid price P and updating their
beliefs - tender unless the price is strictly lower than the expected post-takeover security
benets. This is to say that they do not select a weakly dominated action at the time of
the tendering decision. This assumption ensures a unique equilibrium outcome: When the
free-rider condition is violated, the bid fails. Otherwise, success is the unique equilibrium
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outcome, and the bidder acquires all shares.4
At stage 1, the bidder is willing to o¤er at most V  K, as a successful o¤er attracts all
shares. Thus, the bidders participation constraint is simply V  K  P .
To avoid trivial outcomes, we impose a joint restriction on takeover cost, maximum
extraction rate, and the support of bidder types.
Assumption 1 V < K < V .
These restrictions ensure that some but not all bidder types can make a protable bid
when paying a price equal to their respective post-takeover security benets. This in turn
excludes outcomes where either no or all bidder types make an o¤er.
In any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, the bidder must have correct expectations about
which bid prices are acceptable and must prefer the smallest successful o¤er. Given that
shareholders by assumption tender when the free-rider condition is satised, this immediately
rules out equilibria in which o¤ers succeed at di¤erent prices. As there can be only a single
equilibrium price P

, shareholders infer from observing a bid that such price may come
from any bidder type who makes a non-negative prot at that price. Thus, shareholders
conditional expectations about post-takeover security benets are
E (XjP ; K) = (1  )E (V jV  P  +K) :
Given the distribution of V , a bid is therefore made and succeeds in equilibrium if the
bidders participation constraint
V   P   K (1)
and the free-rider condition
P    1   Z V
P +K
g(V )
1 G[P  +K]V dV (2)
hold.
There exists a continuum of prices that satisfy these conditions and so constitute Perfect
Bayesian Equilibria of the tender o¤er game. Following Shleifer and Vishny (1986), we
select the minimum bid equilibrium which is the unique equilibrium satisfying the credible
4Given that a bid is conditional, a shareholder who believes the bid to fail is indi¤erent between tendering
and retaining. Imposing this belief on all shareholders and breaking the indi¤erence in favour of retaining
supports failure as an equilibrium, irrespective of the o¤ered price (Burkart et al., 2006). To avoid co-
existence of success and failure as equilibrium outcomes, it is typically assumed that shareholders tender
when they are indi¤erent. Contrary to our assumption, this precludes failure as the equilibrium outcome for
a conditional bid, and hence the existence of an equilibrium when the free-rider condition is violated.
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beliefs criterion of Grossman and Perry (1986). All other equilibria require shareholders to
believe that bidders generate, on average, security benets that are smaller than the o¤ered
equilibrium price. (Details of the equilibrium selection are provided in the Appendix.)
Proposition 1 Given the one share - one vote structure, only bidder types V 2 [V c; V ] make
a bid and o¤er the same price P  where P  = min

P : P = (1  )E (V jV  P +K)	 and
V c = P  +K.
Since a bidder can appropriate part of the revenues as private benets, some value-
increasing bids succeed in equilibrium despite the target shareholdersfree-rider behaviour.
Nonetheless, all bidder types below the cut-o¤ value V c are frustrated.5 Asymmetric infor-
mation aggravates the free-rider problem, which becomes most apparent when considering
the bidders participation constraint V  [(P   X) +K]. In a full information setting,
free-riding would imply P  = X, and all bidder types with V  K would make a successful
bid. Under asymmetric information, P  = X holds on average, but not for each individual
bidder type. Instead, some bidder types pay more and others less than their respective post-
takeover security benets. Such mispricing deters some bidder types whose private benets
are su¢ cient to cover the takeover cost. That is, the cut-o¤ value V c under asymmetric
information exceeds K= (the cut-o¤ value under full information).6 Moreover, bidder types
V 2 [K=; V c) cannot succeed with a lower o¤er because all bidder types V  V c would
then make the same o¤er, and target shareholders would on average be o¤ered less than the
post-takeover security benets. Hence, asymmetric information exacerbates the free-rider
problem and prevents some bids, even though they would be value-increasing.
Corollary 1 Takeover probability decreases with the takeover cost and increases with private
benets.
The ex ante probability of a takeover corresponds to the probability that a bidder type
exceeds cut-o¤ value V c. Accordingly, the corollary follows from the fact that the cut-o¤
value increases in K but decreases in .
When takeover cost increases, any bidder who can still break even must on average
generate higher revenues. As a bid signals higher post-takeover security benets, target
shareholders tender only at a higher price. This increases the cut-o¤value, thereby decreasing
takeover probability.
5In an extension with private benet extraction, Chowdhry and Jegadeesh (1994) derive an equilibrium
in which a subset of bidder types also o¤er an uninformative bid price.
6To see this, rewrite the cut-o¤bidder types participation constraint, V c P   K, as V c K  P  Xc.
If P  > Xc, this inequality requires that V c > K, or equivalently V c > K=. Finally, note that indeed
P  = E(XjX  Xc) > Xc as Xc < X by Assumption 1.
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By contrast, larger private benets (-values) not only enable bidders to recoup takeover
cost more easily, but also lower post-takeover share value. Both e¤ects induce target share-
holders to revise their expectations about post-takeover share value downward. This lowers
both the equilibrium bid price and the cut-o¤ value.
In our framework with cash o¤ers, the equilibrium price reveals only that bidder valuation
V is above cut-o¤value V c. As a consequence, the free-rider problem is aggravated, and more
bidder types are deterred relative to the full information setting. Relaxing the restrictions
on the bid form can help to overcome the asymmetric information problem. Indeed, an all-
security exchange o¤er replicates the full information outcome, although it does not reveal
bidder type: Shareholders accept a bid that exchanges each share against a new share,
thereby preserving their fraction of the cash ow rights. If the o¤er were to exchange shares
at less than a one-to-one ratio, each shareholder would reject it. Moreover, all bidder types
whose private benets are su¢ cient to cover the takeover cost are willing to make such a
one-to-one security exchange o¤er.7
Although the all-securities exchange o¤er resolves the asymmetric information problem,
it is unconvincing for two reasons. First, it leaves all cash ow rights with the shareholders,
making it equivalent to a simple replacement of management. This begs the question of
why a takeover is needed in the rst place. Second, the bidder gains control only if it
o¤ers non-voting equity, or at least separates the majority of the votes from the cash ow
rights. Thus, the takeover implements a new security-voting structure. More generally, once
bidders are allowed to freely recombine votes and cash ow rights, the existing security-voting
structure becomes irrelevant to the takeover outcome (Hart, 1995). Like previous models in
this literature (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1988), we treat the security-voting structure as a
constraint rather than a choice variable of the bidder.
3 Non-Voting Shares and Takeover Activity
We now explore the impact of dual-class shares on takeover outcome. More specically, the
target rm has a fraction s 2 (0; 1] of voting shares entitled to the same (pro-rata) cash
ow rights as the 1  s non-voting shares. Here we treat the fraction s as a parameter and
analyze its optimal choice in the next section.
The takeover bid and the decision to tender proceed under the same premises as before.
In addition, the tender o¤er may discriminate between share classes but not within the same
7Contrary to bilateral bargaining models (e.g., Eckbo et al., 1990; Hansen, 1987), Burkart and Lee (2010)
show that neither restricted bids nor the means of payment (mix of cash and equity) can serve as a signal
in tender o¤er games.
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class. Thus, the bidder may quote di¤erent prices for voting and non-voting shares. However,
if the bidder submits a price for a particular share class, it must buy all tendered shares from
that class, conditional upon a control transfer.8
To derive the equilibrium, we initially assume that the bidder o¤ers to buy only voting
shares. As we show below, this is (part of) the optimal bidding strategy. Since either all or
none of the voting shareholders tender in equilibrium, a bidder must pay sP to gain control.
Hence, the bidders participation constraint is
V   s (P  X)  K. (3)
Upon observing a bid, shareholders infer that the bidder can make a prot when buying
all s voting shares at that price. Consequently, their expectations are
E [X jV  V c(s; P ) ] =  1   Z V
V c(s;P )
g(V )
1 G[V c(s; P )]V dV (4)
where
V c(s; P )  sP +K+ s  1   .
In equilibrium, the bid price must at least match these expectations. As before, we impose
the credible beliefs criterion to select the minimum bid equilibrium.
Lemma 1 Given s 2 [0; 1], only bidder types V 2 [V c(s); V ] make a bid and o¤er the same
price sP (s) for the voting shares where P (s) = min

P : P = (1  )E (V jV  V c(s; P ))	
and V c(s) = V c(s; P (s)).
Lemma 1 replicates Proposition 1 for a target rm with dual-class shares. All bidder
types who make a bid o¤er the same price, which is equal to their average post-takeover
security benets. Hence, a given bidder type purchases the s voting shares either at a
premium (P (s) > X) or at a discount (P (s) < X), but the gains of the undervalued
bidder types are exactly o¤set by the losses of the overvalued types. Furthermore, all bidder
types V < V c(s) abstain from bidding because the cost of purchasing overpriced (voting)
shares exceeds their private benets net of takeover cost.
Since non-voting - like voting - shareholders tender only if the bidder o¤ers at least the
post-takeover security benets, a bidder needs to o¤er the same price to purchase the non-
voting shares. Accordingly, only undervalued bidder types have an incentive to extend the
8The assumption that a bid must be unrestricted for a given class is not critical. Indeed, one can easily
replicate the analysis of intra-class restricted bids by redening s. For example, restricted o¤ers for half of
the voting shares are equivalent to unrestricted o¤ers for all s0 = s=2 voting shares.
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o¤er P  to non-voting shares. Since shareholders are aware of this, they would reject bids
for all shares. Thus, acquiring only voting shares is optimal for all bidder types who make
a bid in equilibrium: Overvalued bidder types limit the loss on the shares purchased in the
o¤er, while undervalued bidder types avoid revealing that they purchase the voting shares
at a discount.
Even though non-voting shareholders are excluded from the o¤er, both classes of share-
holders realize the same expected payo¤. Conditional on a takeover, voting shareholders
receive the bid price in cash, whereas non-voting shareholders retain shares of uncertain
value. In equilibrium, the mispricing cancels out on average such that the expected post-
takeover share value equals the cash amount paid to the voting shareholders.
Equal expected payo¤s in an uncontested takeover translate into a zero voting premium
only if a bidding contest is from an ex-ante perspective a zero-probability event. Otherwise,
voting shares trade at a premium that reects the odds that the market puts on a future
bidding contest. Voting premia do not arise in our model precisely because the model
analyses the takeover outcome when a bidding contest does not materialize.9
The comparative static properties of the minimum bid equilibrium are key to our subse-
quent analysis of the optimal security-voting structure. Lemma 1 shows that each security-
voting structure s maps into a unique minimum bid equilibrium. (Being the minimum of
a closed subset of R, P (s) is always unique.) Moreover, we show in the Appendix that
equilibrium price P (s) and cut-o¤ value V c(s) are continuously increasing in the fraction s
of voting shares. This has a straightforward implication for the takeover probability.
Proposition 2 Non-voting shares promote takeovers.
In equilibrium, the marginal bidder type who makes bid (V = V c(s)) purchases the
voting shares at a loss that is exactly o¤set by its private benets net of takeover cost.
A lower fraction of voting shares enables such bidder to earn a positive prot as it must
purchase fewer overvalued shares. In addition, fewer voting shares render a bid feasible to
some previously deterred bidder types whose participation constraint (3) is now satised.
Hence, a higher fraction of non-voting shares induces more bidder types to bid, even if the
price were to remain unchanged.
Shareholders infer that less exposure to mispricing extends the pool of bidder types
making a bid. They revise their expectations accordingly and are willing to tender at a
lower price. This price e¤ect in turn further relaxes the participation constraint (3) and
9Furthermore, the result of equal expected returns to both classes of shareholders is specic to the
minimum bid equilibrium. In any other Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, tendering (voting) shareholders receive
on average more than the expected post-takeover security benets, and voting shares trade accordingly at a
premium.
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induces additional bidder types to bid, thereby reinforcing the reduction in the minimum
acceptable bid price.
4 Optimal Security-Voting Structure
The quality of a security-voting structure is determined by the extent to which it frustrates
value-decreasing bids but encourages value-increasing bids. To examine both dimensions, we
introduce value-decreasing bidder types and let V I 2 V ; V .
The presence of value-decreasing bidder types does not a¤ect the analysis and results
presented thus far. Indeed, share value under the incumbent management is irrelevant to the
takeover outcome. Each shareholder tenders if the o¤ered bid price matches the conditional
expected post-takeover security benets. Similarly, the decision to make a tender o¤er
depends for a given price solely on bidder type. Hence, Lemma 1 continues to hold for any
V I 2 V ; V , and success for a value-decreasing bid is an equilibrium outcome in our setting
whenever V I > V  V c(s).
It must be noted that failure of a conditional tender o¤er - whether value-decreasing or
increasing - can in general be supported as an equilibrium outcome (see fn. 4). However, our
assumption that shareholders tender to a given bid unless, given their beliefs, retaining is a
weakly dominant choice, eliminates failure as an equilibrium if the bid satises the free-rider
condition. That is, when success or failure of a given bid can be supported as equilibrium
outcomes, we select success even if the bidder is inferior to the incumbent manager.
Alternatively, one may assume that shareholders reject all bids below the current share
value. This selection criterion abstracts from coordination problems among dispersed share-
holders, such as the pressure-to-tender problem and the resulting undesirable takeover out-
comes. But these are precisely the major issues in the literature on takeover regulation (e.g.,
Bebchuk and Hart, 2001). Addressing these concerns, we select success as the equilibrium
outcome and analyze how the security-voting structure can help to overcome coordination
problems.
Given our selection criterion, V I a¤ects neither takeover probability nor takeover out-
come. Nonetheless, since it represents revenues when a takeover fails, V I is relevant to the
choice of security-voting structure. To analyze this choice, we assume that the social plan-
ner decides on the fraction s 2 (0; 1] of voting shares, knowing current share value, takeover
cost K, the upper bound  and the distribution of bidder types. Later (Section 4.2), we
also derive the shareholderspreferred security-voting structure under the same information
assumptions.
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4.1 Social Planners Choice
From a social perspective, the takeover cost is a deadweight loss, and it is immaterial how
the revenues are shared between shareholders and the bidder or incumbent manager. Hence,
the expected social welfare is
W = (1  Pr(V  V c))V I + Pr(V  V c) (E [V jV  V c] K) .
Takeovers are socially desirable if they increase revenues by more than the takeover cost.
That is, the socially optimal cut-o¤ value is equal to V I +K. Indeed, inserting the takeover
probability converts the social welfare function into






V   V I  K dV ,
and the rst-order condition with respect to V c yields
V csoc = V
I +K. (5)
Since @2W=@ (V c)2

V csoc
=  g(V csoc) < 0, the rst-order condition identies the unique op-
timum. Implementing the optimal cut-o¤ value is straightforward in view of the inverse
relationship between s and V c (Proposition 2).
Proposition 3 Each rm has a unique socially optimal fraction of non-voting shares which
decreases with the revenues generated by the incumbent manager and increases in the quality
of shareholder protection.
Due to the monotonic relationship between s and V c, there is a unique fraction of voting
shares that implements the cut-o¤ value V I + K (or the closest achievable value). Thus,
each rm as dened by its V I has a unique socially optimal security-voting structure which
increases in V I . So long as the optimal security-voting structure includes both voting and
non-voting shares (0 < s < 1), such structure achieves the rst-best control allocation: It
frustrates only value-decreasing bids. This does not hold for the two corner solutions, s = 1
and s = 0. If V I is su¢ ciently high, the one share - one vote structure is constrained optimal
in the sense that not all (though as many as possible) value-decreasing bids are frustrated.
Similarly, for su¢ ciently low V I , complete separation of cash ow and voting rights does not
ensure that all value-increasing bids succeed.
Variations in the optimal fraction of non-voting shares across rms translate into varying
degrees of control contestability. Low values of V I go together with high fractions of non-
voting shares. Such stark deviations from one share - one vote are necessary to elicit bids
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from the many bidder types that can generate higher revenues (net of takeover cost) than
the incumbent manager. By contrast, one share - one vote is optimal if the rm is run by a
su¢ ciently competent manager. Since most bidder types are in this case less competent, the
optimal takeover barrier is set high. In all other cases, one share - one vote o¤ers incumbent
managers too much protection. Thus, we nd that deviations from one share - one vote are
in many cases socially optimal. At the same time, our theory concurs with the argument
that one share - one vote is e¤ective in deterring value-decreasing bids (Grossman and Hart,
1988).
Higher maximum extraction rates enable bidders to recoup takeover costs more easily
and they lower shareholder expectations about post-takeover share value. Higher extraction
rates and non-voting shares are therefore substitutes; both promote takeovers. As a result,
more voting shares are required to implement a given cut-o¤ value, when other governance
mechanisms put weaker constraints on private benet extraction. This suggests that the
rationale for one share - one vote is strongest in countries with weak shareholder protection
whereas shares with di¤erential voting rights may be desirable in environments where extrac-
tion is limited by strong institutions. Incidentally, a tentative but suggestive European study
(European Commission, 2007) reports that non-voting preference shares and multiple-vote
shares appear to be most frequently used in the UK and Sweden, both commonly considered
countries with strong shareholder protection (Nenova, 2003).10
Proposition 3 has several policy implications. First, it suggests that the optimal security-
voting structure is rm-specic and country-specic. Hence, it weakens the case for harmo-
nizing security-voting structure regulation, especially across otherwise diverse governance
systems. Second, it raises doubt about the desirability of the so-called coattailprovision,
which requires bidders to make voting and non-voting shareholders the same o¤er (Allaire,
2006). This provision replicates the one share - one vote structure and hence may deter
some value-increasing bids. Thus, even though this provision leads to higher takeover pre-
mia, it need neither be socially optimal nor in the target shareholdersinterest. Third, the
argument also pertains to restricted bids for single-class targets. Like non-voting shares,
restricted bids reduce the fraction of cash ow rights the bidder must purchase to gain con-
trol. Consequently, Proposition 3 implies that the mandatory bid rule can deter too many
10The optimal fraction of non-voting shares also depends on the size of the takeover cost. On the one hand,
higher costs raise the socially optimal cut-o¤ value, as the revenues generated by the bidder must exceed
current revenues by a larger margin. On the other hand, higher costs require larger private benets to break
even. This deterrence e¤ect is reinforced by the adjustment of shareholder expectations about post-takeover





As the equilibrium bid price always equals the expected post-takeover share value, voting
and non-voting shareholders have homogeneous preferences. Hence, we may describe their
collective and individual preferences via the aggregate wealth function




1 G(V c) (1  )
 
V   V I dV . (6)
In contrast to the social planner, shareholders are concerned only about security benets.
Simplifying and deriving the rst-order condition with respect to V c yields
V csh = V
I .
Target shareholders benet from a takeover whenever the bidder can generate more revenues
than the incumbent manager, irrespective of takeover cost. Thus, target shareholders prefer
a lower cut-o¤ value than socially optimal and choose an accordingly lower fraction of voting
shares. The privately and socially optimal security-voting structures coincide only when both
are corner solutions, i.e., when either complete separation is socially optimal or one share -
one vote is privately optimal. In all other cases, shareholders prefer too many takeovers.
Unless the incumbent manager is of high quality, shareholders benet from a dual-class
structure as it increases expected takeover gains. Accordingly, shares under the dual-class
structure command a higher price. This in turn translates into higher proceeds for a block-
holder who wishes to exit. Thus, our theory argues that the adoption of dual-class share
structures - whether before or after going public - can be part of an optimal sale procedure.12
Consistent with this prediction, several empirical studies report positive abnormal returns
following the announcement of dual-class recapitalizations (Adams and Ferreira, 2008). In
particular, Bauguess et al. (2007) report that most dual-class recapitalizations in their sam-
ple are associated with sell-outs by dominant shareholders.
Like the social planner, shareholders have an interest to protect competent managers.
11While restricted bids are functionally similar to non-voting shares, they are by no means equivalent.
First, partial bids must be for at least 50 percent of the cash ow rights to ensure a voting majority, whereas
the fraction of cash ow rights attached to voting shares can be lower. Hence, a dual-class structure is in
principle a more powerful instrument with which to screen bidders. Second, the security-voting structure is
set by the target rm, while the fraction of shares to which the bid is restricted is in the bidders discretion.
12Bebchuk and Zingales (2000) o¤er a similar rationale for dual-class shares. In their model, a dual-class
structure enables the rm founder to extract more rents from a future acquirer. Here, dual-class shares
encourage takeover bids once ownership has been dispersed.
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Their preferred level of control contestability, and hence the optimal fraction of non-voting
shares, decreases in the incumbents ability.
Proposition 4 For a given rm, a dual-class share structure may increase the proceeds
from selling out in the stock market. Nevertheless, under both the privately and the socially
optimal security-voting structures, rms with (more) non-voting shares have lower market
values.
A rms market value increases with the incumbent managers ability, even though the
probability of a value-increasing takeover decreases. To see why this is the case, compare two
rms, 1 and 2, with V I1 < V
I
2 . Under the privately optimal structure, all bids that increase
shareholder value succeed, and rm 1 is more likely to be taken over. The di¤erence in the




= G(V I2 ) G(V I1 ), which is the probability
that rm 1 is taken over by a bidder with valuation V 2 (V I1 ; V I2 ], thereby (partially) catching
up with rm 2s current value. That is, rm 1s higher takeover probability stems only from
the potential value improvements that rm 2 has already realized. Thus, rm 2s shares must
have a higher market value under the privately optimal security-voting structure. Clearly
this reasoning also applies to the rms socially optimal structures, which takes takeover
costs into account.
Proposition 4 is consistent with empirical studies reporting a valuation discount for dual-
class rms (Gompers et al., 2008; Villalonga and Amit, 2009). However, our result di¤ers
from the standard explanation, typically raised with respect to controlling shareholders, that
the use of dual-class shares induces corporate insiders to extract more private benets at the
expense of share value (e.g., Bebchuk et al., 2000; Masulis et al., 2009). In our model with
dispersed control, the causality runs in the opposite direction: It is low rm value under the
incumbent manager that induces shareholders to choose (more) non-voting shares. In doing
so, they increase the likelihood that a better management team will acquire the rm.
Given that non-voting shares and extraction rates are substitutes, the question arises of
which combination of s and  target shareholders prefer. To this end, we compare two regimes
implementing the same takeover probability. More precisely, consider the alternatives f0; s0g
and f00; s00g, where 0 < 00, s0 < s00 and V cjs0;0 = V cjs00;00.
Proposition 5 For a given takeover probability, shareholder wealth is higher in the regime
with less extraction and more non-voting shares.
This result reverses the role commonly attributed to the security-voting structure and to
private benet extraction (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1980, 1988). In our setting, shareholders
do not choose a high  to promote takeovers and a high s to frustrate ine¢ cient bids.
18
Instead, a low  is used to deter undesirable bidders and a low s is used to encourage
the others. The security-voting structure a¤ects redistribution among bidder types. More
specically, reducing the fraction of voting shares promotes takeovers by reducing the gains
that high bidder types earn from mimicking low bidder types. By contrast, the extraction
rate a¤ects how the takeover surplus is split between shareholders and bidders. When using
 to encourage bids, shareholders essentially bribe bidders out of their own pockets. From
a social perspective, the regimes are equivalent as they both implement the same takeover
probability and hence the same control allocation.
5 Pooling Along Two Dimensions
So far, we have assumed that the security and private benets are positively correlated.
This is a plausible assumption when private benets are primarily determined by target rm
characteristics and the institutional environment rather than bidder characteristics. At the
same time, one may well argue that security and private benets are independent, or even
negatively correlated, because of bidder-specic governance di¤erences.
The assumed correlation between security benets and private benets matters with
respect to the impact of non-voting shares. For instance, when security and private benets
are inversely related, forcing bidders to acquire a larger fraction of cash ow rights can
encourage takeover bids (Marquez and Yilmaz, 2006). To illustrate this point, consider an
extreme two-bidder-type example: Both bidder types create the same value V but di¤er in
their extraction abilities. Bidder 1 can extract the entire V as private benets, while bidder
2 can extract no private benets. If o¤ers were fully revealing, bidder 2 would have to o¤er
the entire V . Hence, bidder 2 does not make a bid unless it is pooled with bidder 1. The
pooling price allows bidder 2 to buy shares at a price below V and to make a prot despite
the absence of private benets. Fewer voting shares decrease bidder 2s prots and may
prevent it from recouping the takeover cost. To be sure, bidder 2 never bids under complete
separation of cash ow and voting rights.
In the two-bidder-type example, as in the preceding sections, non-voting shares reduce
the extent of redistribution among bidder types. However, the impact of redistribution
di¤ers across the two settings. It discourages takeovers when security and private benets
are positively correlated, but has the opposite e¤ect when they are inversely related. In
general, in settings where bidders with large (small) security benets can have large or small
private benets, one would expect the two e¤ects to be conicting. Interestingly, this need
not be the case. As we show below, the e¤ects can positively reinforce each other in the
promotion of takeovers.
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Consider a tender o¤er game with four bidder types, (X;) 2 X;X	  0;	, all of
whom generate more value than the incumbent manager. Each bidder knows its own type,
whereas target shareholders merely know the respective probabilities, X;. For simplicity,
we assume that takeover costK is small. The takeover bid and the decision to tender proceed
under the same premises as before.
Clearly, type (X; 0) cannot make a protable bid as the price must at least match X
in equilibrium. Hence, the optimal security-voting structure implements an outcome in




can always make a









to bid. This challenge captures the general problem of promoting
takeovers along two dimensions: to encourage bidder types with large security benets along
with bidder types with large private benets.13
Proposition 6 Complete separation of cash ow and voting rights is never optimal, whereas





refrains from bidding when it must purchase shares at a large pre-
mium. As the inequality in the Proposition shows, this is more likely when such bidders
net private gains  K are small relative to the premium E [X j(X;) 6= (X; 0)] X that
it must pay. Introducing non-voting shares reduces the number of shares that must be ac-
quired at a premium. That is, restricting redistribution among bidders may be necessary to
encourage the bidder type with small security benets to make a bid.




may refrain from bidding not because she has to buy
shares at a premium but because its private benets do not cover the takeover cost. To
make a protable bid, such bidder needs to purchase shares at a price below the true post-
takeover security benets X. Yet, target shareholders do not tender at such a price unless













participates, and redistribution among bidder types promotes
takeovers: Bidding by the bidder type with small security benets lowers the bid price, which
in turn makes it protable for the bidder type with large security benets (but small private
benets).14
13For X0 = 0 and constant X  X; + X0, the setting converges to the no-correlation case when
X; ! X and to the negative correlation case when X0 ! X . Proposition 6 also applies to either case,
as it only depends on X , but not on the individual probabilities X; and X0.
14When the takeover cost K is large, the optimal security-voting structure may at best implement a
mixed-strategy equilibrium in whichbidder type (X;) always makes a bid and bidder types (X; 0) and
(X;) randomize. The qualitative result that bidder type (X; 0) never bids unless bidder type (X;)
(sometimes) bids, as well as the fact that the latter may have to be induced to bid by introducing non-voting






makes a bid in equilibrium, further reductions in the fraction
of voting shares can be detrimental. With fewer voting shares, the gains from purchasing
shares at a discount shrink. Below a certain threshold level, there is too little redistribution
for the bidder type with large security benets to make a protable bid.
To summarize, (more) non-voting shares have three e¤ects. First, there is a positive
direct e¤ect which facilitates bids from bidder types with large private benets. Second, this
leads to an indirect price e¤ect - lower shareholder expectations and hence bid price - which
facilitates bids from bidder types with large security benets. Third, there is for a given bid
price a negative direct e¤ect which discourages bids from bidder types with large security
benets.
These three e¤ects of non-voting shares are also present in more general settings with
a continuous-type space (X;) 2 X;X  0;. Suppose that a rms security-voting
structure is s and that P (s) is the corresponding equilibrium price. In equilibrium, the
set of bidder types that makes a bid includes all types (X;) for which the participation
constraint
  max fK + s [P (s) X] ; 0g
is satised. In Figure 1a, this set represents all bidder types above the solid downward-sloping
line.
Insert gure about here
Keeping the price constant, a reduction in s to s0 < s has two direct e¤ects. On the one
hand, it relaxes the participation constraint for all bidder types that su¤er from redistribution
[P (s) > X]. On the other hand, it tightens the participation constraint for all bidder
types that benet from redistribution [P (s) < X]. The positive and negative direct e¤ects
are represented by the vertically and horizontally striped areas in Figure 1a. Apart from
the redistribution e¤ect, there is also the indirect price e¤ect. Because the decrease to s0
induces bidder types with smaller security benets to make a bid, shareholders reduce their
expectations about post-takeover security benets and hence lower the price at which they
are willing to tender from P (s) to P (s0). This relaxes the participation constraint for all
bidder types, as the diagonally striped area in Figure 1b illustrates.
The overall impact of non-voting shares depends on the relative strength of these three
e¤ects, which in turn depends on the distribution of bidder types and the takeover cost.
In Figure 1a, non-voting shares are more likely to be benecial when bidder distributions
have little probability mass in the horizontally striped area. Moreover, it is straightforward
to see that this area is smaller when the takeover cost K is smaller. Finally, even if the
negative direct e¤ect is considerable, it is mitigated by the indirect price e¤ect. When
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the price e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong, non-voting shares unambiguously broaden the pool of
bidders: By attracting bidder types with smaller security benets, non-voting shares reduce
the equilibrium bid price, thereby allowing bidder types with large security benets to make
a prot by buying shares at a discount.
The optimal security-voting structure strikes a balance between the above e¤ects. Due
to the negative direct e¤ect, the optimal structure may be interior (0 < s < 1) even
when all bidder types are value-increasing. In the presence of value-decreasing bidder types
(X +   V I), additional constraints arise from the screening motives discussed in Section
4. However, the insights of that section continue to hold - the optimal fraction of non-
voting shares decreases in the incumbent managers ability, and a rms optimal fraction of
non-voting shares and its market value are inversely related.
6 Conclusion
This paper identies a new mechanism through which the security-voting structure inuences
the tender o¤er outcome. When the bidder has private information about the post-takeover
security benets, it and the target shareholders may not agree on a mutually acceptable
price, and the takeover fails. Non-voting shares mitigate this problem because the bidder
can acquire control while buying fewer cash ow rights. Conversely, one share - one vote
maximizes the risk that disparate information about the security benets prevents a takeover.
Therefore, one share - one vote is in general not optimal.
While developed in a takeover model with atomistic shareholders, the insight that sepa-
rating cash ow and voting rights can help to bring about e¢ cient control transactions is not
conned to tender o¤ers. The essence of free-rider behaviour is to create a link between the
bidders private information and each target shareholders outside option, which in turn can
lead to disagreement about the purchase price. Such disagreement is by no means limited to
settings with an innite number of uninformed shareholders. For instance, this can also arise
when current owners suspect a potential buyer of wanting to purchase their rm because
it is (currently) undervalued. To invalidate this suspicion, the buyer may have to o¤er a
price that renders the acquisition unprotable despite its value improvements. Separating
the trade of cash ow and control rights can overcome this deadlock.
In the recurring debate about the optimality of one share - one vote, dual-class shares are
often criticized because they allow owners to lock in control without holding a corresponding
majority stake. By contrast, this paper shows that widely held dual-class shares increase
control contestability, thereby promoting value-increasing takeovers. For this reason, single-
class structures in dispersedly held rms entrench professional managers and need not be
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in the dispersed shareholders best interest. Conversely, dual-class recapitalizations may
increase share value and be a means for dominant shareholders to improve the terms at which
they sell out in the market. Furthermore, the optimal security-voting structure depends
on the quality of both the incumbent manager and the governance mechanisms limiting
management self-dealing. Thus, our analysis casts doubt on the merits of mandating a
uniform security-voting structure across rms or countries.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Dene the function f(P )  (1 )E (V jV  P +K) for P 2 V  K;V  K. This function
has the following properties.
(a) f(P ) is continuous.
(b) f(V  K) = (1  )E (V ) > V  K.
(c) f(V  K) = (1  )V < V  K.
While property (a) follows from the continuity of the density function g(), (b) and (c)
follow from Assumption 1. Indeed, V < K is equivalent to (1  )V > V  K which implies
(1  )E(V ) > V  K. Similarly, (1  )V < V  K follows from V > K.
Properties (a) to (c) imply that there exists at least one xed point of f(P ). Denote the
smallest xed point by P . From properties (a) to (c), it follows that (2) is satised for some
P  P , whereas it is violated for all P < P . Denoting Sf  fP : P  f(P )g, it follows
that P  = minSf .
Any element in Sf can be supported as a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium by imposing
appropriate out-of-equilibrium beliefs, e.g., E[V jP ] = V for all P 6= P+ where P+ is some
element in Sf . The credible beliefs criterion imposes that target shareholders believe a
deviating (out-of-equilibrium) bid to come only from bidder types that would want the bid
to succeed. For any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with P+ > P , denote the set of bidder
types whose participation constraint is satised for P  by D  V 2 V ; V  : V  P  +K	
and its complement by DC . No bidder type in DC would want to bid P  and succeed,
whereas bidder types in D would want to bid and succeed. Consequently, the credible beliefs
criterion imposes that shareholders believe Pr [V 2 DjP = P ] = 1. Given such beliefs and
sequential rationality, shareholders would accept the deviation bid P . Hence, no Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium with P+ > P  survives the credible beliefs renement. If P+ = P ,
there exists no bid price to which any bidder type would like to deviate as any lower price
is rejected. Hence, P  is the unique price (Perfect Sequential Equilibrium) that satises the
credible beliefs criterion. 
Proof of Corollary 1
In the minimum bid equilibrium, V c = P  + K and P  = E(XjV  V c) = E(XjV 
P  + K). From the proof of Proposition 1, we know that P < E(XjV  P + K) for any
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P < P . Now consider the e¤ect of an increase in the takeover cost from K to K^ where
K^ > K. All else equal, the cut-o¤ value increases. Thus, a necessary condition for V^ c  V c
is that P^  < P . However, this would violate the free-rider condition. To see this, note
that P < E(XjV  P + K) implies P < E(XjV  P + K^), with the former condition
being satised for any P < P . Hence, it must be that P^  > P . This in turn implies
that V^ c > V c. The positive relation between takeover probability and extraction rate 
follows directly from the proof of Proposition 1 and the fact that an increase in  reduces
f(P ) = (1  )E(V jV  P +K) for any given P . 
Proof of Lemma 1
The free-rider condition is now given by
P  (1  )E [V jV  V c(s; P )] = (1  )
Z V
V c(s;P )
g(V )V dV= (1 G [V c(s; P )])
Dene h(s; P )  (1  )E [V jV  V c(s; P )] for P 2 V  K;V  K. As V c(s; P ) is contin-
uous in P , so is h(s; P ). (Note that h(s; P ) = f(P ) for s = 1.) Like f(P ) in the proof of
Proposition 1, h(s; P ) satises property (b)
g(s; V  K) = (1  )E
"
V
V  sV + (1  s)K+ s  1  
#
 (1  )E (V ) > V  K
and property (c)
g(s; V  K) = (1  )E
"
V
V  sV + (1  s)K+ s  1  
#
 (1  )V < V  K.
Hence, existence and uniqueness of the minimum bid equilibrium follow from the proof of
Proposition 1. 
Proof of Proposition 2
Since h(s; P )  (1   )E [V jV  V c] is an increasing function of V c, we know that h(s; P )
is increasing in s if and only if








This condition is satised as the free-rider condition
P  (1  )E
"
V
V  sP +K+ s  1  
#
implies
P > (1  ) sP +K+ s  1  
which is equivalent to (A.2). Given condition (A.2) holds, h(s; P ) is increasing in s for all
potential solutions to P  h(s; P ), including the minimum bid equilibrium P (s). 
Proof of Proposition 3
It remains to show that the optimal fraction of voting shares s is decreasing in the quality
of shareholder protection . The threshold V csoc is independent of both  and s. For a given
, the optimal s must be such that V c(s; ) = V csoc. Consider the extraction rates  < 
0
and the corresponding optimal security-voting structures s and s0. The rst step is to
establish that V c(s; ) > V c(s; 0). To see this, insert the explicit expressions for V c(s; )
and V c(s; 0) to obtain
sP (s; ) +K
 (1  s) + s >
sP (s; 0) +K

0
(1  s) + s .
The inequality holds because (a) the denominator on the right-hand side is larger and (b)
because P (s; 0) < P (s; ) follows from @V c(s; P )=@ < 0 for any given s and P and
from the arguments made to show that h(s; P ) hence decreases with  (similarly to the proof
of Proposition 2). Given V c(s; ) > V c(s; 0) and @V c(s; P  (s))=@s > 0 (Proposition 2),
s0 > s must hold to implement V c(s0; 0) = V csoc. 
Proof of Proposition 4
We prove this proposition only for the case of privately optimal structures. The proof for
socially optimal structures is analogous. Under the privately optimal structure, every bidder
type with V B  V I (or XB  XI) succeeds. The probability that the bidder is of such a
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type is given by
Pr(V  V I) = 1 G(V I).
The expected security benets conditional on a successful takeover are





The unconditional expected gain from a takeover is therefore
Pr(V  V I)(1  )E(V V  V I ) = (1  )Z V
V I
g(V )V dV ,
and the current market value, which also takes into account the security benets in the
absence of a takeover, is
(1  )
"






Taking the partial derivative of the term in the brackets with respect to V I gives
g(V I)V I +G(V I)  g(V I)V I = G(V I) > 0.
Since higher V I also imply a smaller optimal fraction of non-voting shares, the proposition
follows. 
Proof of Proposition 5





Following the proof of Proposition 3, we know that 0 < 00 implies s0 < s00. Comparing












V   V I dV # ,
proves the result. 
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Proof of Proposition 6
In an equilibrium in which all but bidder type (X; 0) make a bid, the price must satisfy the
free-rider condition
P  E [X j(X;) 6= (X; 0)]  P .
Bidder type (X;)s participation constraint is always satised as the price cannot exceed
X in equilibrium. For a given price P  X, bidder type (X;) makes a bid only if s(X  
P ) +   K or s  s   K=(P  X). Bidder type (X; 0) makes a bid if s(X   P )  K
or s  s  K=(X   P ). Hence, bidder types (X;) and (X; 0) participate if the interval
[s; s]\ [0; 1] is non-empty for prices satisfying the above free-rider condition. For small K, we
have that s 2 (0; 1) so that [s; s] \ [0; 1] is non-empty whenever s  s. The latter inequality









X  P ,
which is compatible with the free-rider condition for su¢ ciently small K as P  !
K!0
X. More
specically, the condition P  P requires that the takeover cost K satises
K   Pr [X = X j(X;) 6= (X; 0)] .
Finally, one share - one vote cannot implement the optimal outcome when s < 1 which is
equivalent to
 K < P  X
 K < E [X j(X;) 6= (X; 0)] X (A.3)
where in (A.3) we choose the minimum bid price to maximize the range of parameters for
which one share - one vote implements the optimal outcome. 
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